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Abstract
It is often thought that the meaning of a legal provision must reside in the minds of its authors or its
interpreters, or a combination of the two. Indeed, the point may seem so obvious that it scarcely needs any
justification. Is there any sense, then, in the claim sometimes made by judges that a law has a meaning of its
own, one that is distinct from the intentions of authors and interpreters alike? At first sight, the claim appears
extravagant and self-serving. However, there is more to it than meets the eye. Drawing on an example from the
world of games, this essay argues that the law makes up a "participatory order of meaning," an autonomous
order to which legal drafters and interpreters bend their minds as they create particular patterns of meaning.
Ultimately, a legal order should be understood as a concrete instance of a transcendent order of justice and
basic values, which in some sense lies both within and beyond the laws of a particular time and place.
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LAW'S MEANING©
BY BRIAN SLATTERY*
It is often thought that the meaning of a legal provision
must reside in the minds of its authors or its
interpreters, or a combination of the two. Indeed, the
point may seem so obvious that it scarcely needs any
justification. Is there any sense, then, in the claim
sometimes made by judges that a law has a meaning of
its own, one that is distinct from the intentions of
authors and interpreters alike? At first sight, the claim
appears extravagant and self-serving. However, there is
more to it than meets the eye. Drawing on an example
from the world of games, this essay argues that the law
makes up a "participatory order of meaning," an
autonomous order to which legal drafters and
interpreters bend their minds as they create particular
patterns of meaning. Ultimately, a legal order should
be understood as a concrete instance of a transcendent
order of justice and basic values, which in some sense
lies both within and beyond the laws of a particular
time and place.
On consid~re souvent que le sens d'une disposition
juridique dolt s'dtablir soit dans l'esprit de ses auteurs
ou des personnes qui l'interpr~tent, soit dans une
combinaison de ceux-ci. Cette pr~tention peut paraitre
si 6vidente qu'ellen'a point besoin d'Etrejustifie. Est-
il done juste de proposer, tel que le font parfois les
magistrats, qu'une loi poss~de un sens propre i elle-
meme, 6galement distinct des intentions de ses auteurs
et de ses interpr~tes? A premiere vue, cette pr6tention
parait exag6r6e et 6goiste. Pourtant, elle m6rite d'6tre
examin6e de plus pr~s. En utilisant un exemple du
monde des jeux, cet essai soutient la these le droit
constitue un ('ordre participitoire de signification,, un
ordre autonome auquel les auteurs et les interpr~tes
des lois r6fl6chissent lorsqu'ils cr6ent des sens
particuliers. En fin de compte, on doit comprendre
l'ordre 16gal comme 6tant la manifestation concrcte
d'un ordre de justice et de valeurs fondamentales qui le
transcend et qui, en quelque sorte, se trouve & la fois h
l'int6rieur et au-delU des lois, a une 6poque et A un
endroit particulier.
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If I begin from where lam and see it as Isee it, then it may also
become possible for me to see it as another sees it.
-Chuang Tzul
What does a statutory provision mean? In some obvious (and
yet puzzling) sense, it seems to express the intentions of its authors-the
people responsible for drafting and enacting the provision. After all, a
statute is not drawn up haphazardly. Its language is normally chosen
with some care and scrutinized in public debate before being approved.
It would be hard to deny that the authors of a provision intend it to
mean something. So it is tempting to think that the reverse is also true:
that the provision means just what its authors intended it to mean. This
view, which has a strong common-sense appeal, may be called
intentionalism.
Of course, in practice it may be hard to find out what a statute's
authors actually had in mind. They do not always leave behind much
evidence of their intentions beyond the bare words of the text. Even
when we can discover some evidence outside the text (what lawyers call
"extrinsic evidence"), it may well reflect the attitudes of only a few of the
many individuals involved in the process of drafting and enactment. In
any case, this supplementary evidence may be ambiguous or
contradictory or it may have little bearing on the particular question that
has arisen. For the authors of a statute are only human: they cannot
foresee all the situations that the statute will be called on to resolve and
so they inevitably lack formulated views on how the statute should be
applied in certain circumstances.
These are practical difficulties. But they do not necessarily go to
show that intentionalism is wrong; just that it may be difficult to carry
out in some situations. In principle, it is still possible to hold that a
statutory provision means whatever the authors intended it to mean.
According to this viewpoint, the interpreters of a statute should make
their best efforts to find out what the authors had in mind, making use of
the text and whatever extrinsic evidence is available. When these
sources fail to provide a definite answer, interpreters may have to resort
to other methods of construction, just as someone who is hard of hearing
may have to rely on clues provided by gestures and the overall context in
order to piece together what a speaker is saying. But these methods are
1 Quoted in T. Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York: New Directions, 1969) at 42.
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secondary. Their only purpose is to determine indirectly what cannot be
determined directly.
But is intentionalism correct? Does a legal provision mean just
what the authors intended it to mean? And if not, what else could it
possibly mean?
The interpretivist school of thought provides an alternative
answer. This school argues that the meaning of a statutory provision lies
in the interpretations of the people responsible for putting the provision
into effect: especially lawyers, judges, and state officials. These people
make up a community of interpreters, whose language, values, beliefs,
and practices provide the context within which a legal provision gains its
meaning. In its purest version, this theory holds that a statutory
provision has no inherent meaning of its own; it means whatever the
community of interpreters decides it means.
Between the intentionalist and the interpretivist camps lie a
variety of more moderate positions. For example, it can be argued that
what a legal provision means is a blend of what its authors intended it to
mean and what its interpreters think it means. The core meaning of the
provision is found in the authors' intentions, as manifested in the text
and any extrinsic evidence. But at the fringes of the provision, where the
authors' intentions become frayed and obscure, legal interpreters weave
their own meaning into the text, guided by what they take to be its
underlying policy 2
Others argue that the intentionalist and interpretive theories are
not necessarily inconsistent. They point out that there are two different
sorts of authorial intent. At one level, the authors of a statute have
certain ideas about the substance of the provisions they enact. These
ideas make up their substantive intent. But the authors may also have
views on the proper methodology for interpreting legal provisions and in
particular the extent to which judges and other state officials are entitled
to rely on their own sense of what the statute means, rather than search
for the authors' substantive intent. These views make up the authors'
interpretive intent3 The distinction highlights the fact that authors do not
necessarily have the interpretive intent that their substantive intent should
carry much weight with the courts. To the contrary, the authors may
consider that their own views on a provision's meaning should count for
2 See, for example, H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) c. 7.
For another middle-range position, see R.M. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1986).
3 The distinction is drawn from P. Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding" (1980) 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204.
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little or nothing in the interpretive process and that judges should
construe the text according to their own best lights.
In this essay, I am less interested in what divides these viewpoints
than in what unites them. For, despite their differences, they all agree
on one basic point: the meaning of a legal provision lies in the
thought-processes of an identifiable group of people-be it the authors
of the provision, its interpreters, or a mix of the two. In short, a legal
provision has no meaning of its own. This "subjectivist" premise is often
considered so obvious that it scarcely needs any justification.4 After all,
in itself a statute is just a scattering of black ink on white paper.
Whatever meaning it possesses must surely lie in the minds of the people
who draft it or who put it into effect.
What are we to make, then, of the claim sometimes made by
judges, that a legal provision has a meaning "of its own," one that is
distinct from the intentions of both its authors and interpreters? Does
this claim make any sense at all? Or is it just a device for concealing
subjective mental operations behind a screen of objectivity, a screen that
serves to shield the exercise of judicial discretion from impertinent and
critical eyes?
The issue has arisen in dramatic form in Canada, in the context
of the judicial struggle to come to terms with the sweeping provisions of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, enacted in 1982.5
Consider, for example, the broad scope of section 7 of the Charter:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The economical wording of the provision glides over a number of
difficult questions. What, for example, is the meaning of the portentous
phrase "principles of fundamental justice?" The text itself gives us little
guidance. However, if we consult the historical record, we find definite
indications of what the federal drafters of the provision thought it
meant. Typical is the statement made by B.L. Strayer, then Assistant
Deputy Minister for Public Law of the Federal Department of Justice, in
testimony before a parliamentary committee examining the proposed
text of the Charter
Mr. Chairman, it was our belief that the words "fundamental justice" would cover the
same thing as what is called procedural due process, that is the meaning of due process in
relation to requiring fair procedure. However, it in our view does not cover the concept
4 See, for example, the discussion of skepticism in Dworkin, supra note 2 at 76-86.
5 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.
11 [hereinafter Charter].
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of what is called substantive due process, which would impose substantive requirements
as to the policy of the law in question. 6
According to Mr. Strayer, then, the section only forbids activities that
are carried out in a procedurally unjust manner, as when a person is
denied a fair hearing. It does not cover acts that are fundamentally
unjust in substance so long as they are implemented "properly," as when
a person is tried with immaculate procedural correctness under a vicious
law.
But Mr. Strayer's viewpoint is not necessarily the end of the
story. Even if it faithfully reflected the outlook of the drafters, it may
not have been shared by the members of the parliamentary committee,
or by the federal Parliament as a whole, or by the provincial
governments that added their seals of approval. Let us, however, waive
these difficulties and assume that Mr. Strayer's testimony embodies the
views of a majority of the Charter's authors. Does such extrinsic
evidence control the section's meaning?
The question arose before the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Motor Vehicle Reference, 7 decided several years after the Charter came
into effect. The Court took a modulated approach. On the one hand, it
held that extrinsic evidence of the intentions of the authors could
properly be considered by a court in interpreting the Charter. But it
neutralized this concession by ruling that such evidence carried little
weight. Indeed, the Court departed from the views of the federal
drafters and held that section 7 went beyond merely procedural matters
and in some instances covered matters of substantive justice. In
particular, it decided that the section prevented legislatures from
imposing mandatory prison terms for "absolute liability" offences, which
do not require subjective knowledge or even negligence on the part of
the accused.
The Supreme Court's judgment has been sharply criticized by
some commentators, who argue that it disregards the substantive intent
of the Charter's authors and greatly expands the judiciary's power to
6 Canada, Parliament, Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada (1980-81),
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of
Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1st sess., 32d Pad., 1980-81, No. 46 (27 January 1981) at
32.
7 Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486
[hereinafter Motor Vehicle Reference]. All references here are to the majority judgment of Lamer J.,
with which Dickson, C.J., Beetz, Chouinard and Le Dain, JJ. concurred. For background and
discussion, see P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at
1032-37 and 1283-91.
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override the decisions of democratic legislatures.8 Some of these critics
adopt a strict intentionalist view of the Charter, holding that it means
whatever the authors substantively intended it to mean, as manifest in
the text and any extrinsic evidence. However, other critics take a more
moderate approach. They argue that courts should follow authorial
intent in matters of general import but are less constrained when it
comes to matters of detail. They also suggest that the importance of
authorial intent should decrease over time so as to allow the text to be
adapted to new conditions and social needs.9
Whatever the differences among the Court's critics, they are
generally united in assuming that the judges in the Motor Vehicle
Reference substituted their personal views for those of the Charter's
authors. In other words, the critics tacitly subscribe to the view that the
Charter does not have any meaning apart from what is supplied by its
authors and interpreters.
Of course, this subjectivist premise is not necessarily confined to
the decision's critics. A friend of the decision might concede that the
judges substituted their own views for the authors' substantive intent but
argue that the Court's reading of the section was desirable on policy
grounds and that the Charter's authors themselves envisaged that judges
might properly take this sort of creative action.
What is interesting is that the Supreme Court itself seems to
adopt a different attitude, one at odds with the subjectivist outlook. The
judgment assumes that the expression "principles of fundamental
justice" in section 7 of the Charter has a meaning of its own, one that is
distinct from the personal views of authors and interpreters alike. As
Justice Lamer states, "the principles of fundamental justice are to be
found in the basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process,
but also of the other components of our legal system." He goes on to
explain:
Whether any given principle may be said to be a principle of fundamental justice within
the meaning of s. 7 will rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, rationale and
essential role of that principle within the judicial process and in our legal system, as it
evolves.10
This approach suggests that, whatever section 7 means, it is not
necessarily what the authors thought it meant or, on the other hand,
8 See, for example, P.J. Monahan & A. Petter, "Developments in Consitutional Law: The
1985-86 Term" (1987) 9 Supreme Court L.R. 69 at 78-102.
9 See P.J. Monahan, Politics and the Constitution (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 74-85.
10 Supra note 7 at 513.
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whatever judges and officials might prefer to think it means.
Interpreters have no business injecting their personal preferences into
the Charter text. Their role is to subordinate their minds to the larger
legal order, and in so doing, elicit the provision's meaning in the
concrete circumstances of the case. That order is constituted by
Canadian legal culture, practices and traditions, which evolve and adapt
over time.
Is there any truth to this approach? Is it possible to conceive of
the legal order as an autonomous or "objective" realm of meaning-a
realm where the meaning of certain acts is in some sense independent of
both enactor and interpreter?11 This fundamental question will occupy
our attention throughout the remainder of this essay.
However, to appreciate the question in its true light, we need to
remember that it is not confined to the domain of law. It arises in many
other areas of human endeavour, notably (if not exclusively) in the
context of social activities that are governed by rules-such as playing a
game or speaking a language. By examining the way in which the
question of autonomous meaning arises in such contexts, we may hope
to gain a better understanding of the way it arises in the law.
So we will begin, in the next section, with a simple example
drawn from the world of chess-a rule-bound world in which the
relationship between players, their intentions, and their moves gives rise
to an interesting series of questions. While the example may seem at
first blush somewhat remote from the issues under consideration here,
we will soon see that the parallels are both close and illuminating.
A SURPRISING MOVE
Suppose that at a crucial point in an international chess match
one of the players, after mulling over his next move, mutters audibly
"King's Bishop to King's Knight 4" and makes a written notation of this
move on a pad at his side. Unexpectedly, he then picks up his Queen
rather than his King's Bishop and deposits it on the same square
identified in the note. The move is lawful, but it is not the one that he
initially indicated. What are we to make of this odd sequence of events?
Here it is useful to distinguish between two alternative
perspectives. Someone interested in the playing of the game, whether
this be the opposing player, the referee, or a chess fan, will be concerned
111 use the term "objective" to denote something that belongs to the object of thought rather
than the thinking subject; in this sense, it contrasts with "subjective."
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mainly with the question: what move did the player actually make? Did
he move his Bishop, as he said he was going to do? Or did he move his
Queen, as evidenced by his physical act? The game cannot continue
without an answer, since it provides the essential context for future
moves. We will call this perspective "participatory" because it
represents the vantage point of someone actually (or imaginatively)
involved in the game and interested in its progress and eventual
outcome.12
By contrast, the biographer, psychologist, or curious observer
may be interested in a different question: what move did the player
intend to make? Did he really mean to move the Bishop but absent-
mindedly pick up the Queen? Or did he intend to move the Queen from
the start but make a mistaken comment and notation? Or did he,
perhaps, change his mind between jotting down the note and picking up
the piece? This line of inquiry is less concerned with the playing of the
game than the causal relationship between the player's acts and their
mental antecedents. We will call this perspective "intentionalist."
Let us start with the participatory perspective. From this vantage
point, we are interested in determining which move the player actually
made. But here the evidence is conflicting. The physical act performed
by the player indicates that the Queen was moved. Yet the player's
remark and notation both support the view that the Bishop was moved,
not the Queen. Which body of evidence should be taken as establishing
the true move?
In practice, the answer is quite straightforward. As far as the
standard game of chess is concerned, what matters is what the player did
with his chess piece, not what he said or wrote about his intentions. The
player's move is governed by a body of rules and conventions, both tacit
and articulate, which exist apart from the player's subjective intent and
which he accredits and contributes to by playing the game. One of the
game's basic conventions is that a move is ordinarily established by the
player's physical act, transferring a chess piece from one spot on the
board to another, not by what the player says or writes.1 3 Moreover, the
12 My account of the participatory perspective owes much to three works: M. Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge, rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); K. Popper, Objective Knowledge,
rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); and M. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J. Macquarrie
& E. Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962). I am also indebted to Hart's analysis of the internal
aspect of rules, supra note 2, especially at 55-56, 86-88, 96, 99-100, and 138-44; and to J. Finnis,
NaturalLaw and NaturalRights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980) c. 1.
13 An exception is where a game must be adjourned prior to completion, in which case the
player whose turn it is writes down the next move and puts it into a sealed envelope which is
entrusted to the referee who keeps it until the game resumes, when the envelope is opened and the
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rules determine which sorts of physical acts count as possible moves and
they assign definite meanings to those acts. So, in the game of chess as it
is currently played, there is little or no scope for "extrinsic evidence" of a
player's intent-evidence beyond the physical act itself.
It could be argued, perhaps, that this attitude is explained by the
player's "interpretive intent." 14 For, if the player is experienced and
knows the rules and conventions of chess, he probably has the
interpretive intent that his moves should be determined by his physical
acts alone, without reference to extrinsic evidence of his "substantive
intent." But this argument is mistaken. Even if the player were
idiosyncratic and actually thought that his opponent and the referee
should consult extrinsic evidence of his substantive intent, the situation
would not be any different. The opponent and referee would still be
justified in ignoring what the player said and wrote on his pad. The
justification lies in the rules and conventions of the game and the basic
understandings and purposes that inform them.
From the participatory perspective, then, the player's move is an
"objective" matter, which does not depend on the player's subjective
thought processes. In chess, it is strictly irrelevant what the player
intended to do; what matters is the move he actually made. The
autonomous status of the move is a function of the autonomy of the
larger order constituted by the game's rules and conventions, both tacit
and explicit.
Of course, the rules of chess are not static. If enough chess
players began to insist, for example, that their moves should be
determined by their written notes, the rules of the game might perhaps
change. After all, the game of "chess by mail" is played this way. But
the new rule would just substitute one sort of autonomous act for
another. So far as the game is concerned, the meaning of a written note
is as autonomous as the meaning of the physical act of moving a chess
piece. In both cases, the meaning is that assigned by the rules and
conventions of chess. This meaning may conceivably differ from what
the player subjectively intended. Players can always make mistaken
notations, that is, notations which fail to reflect their subjective
intentions accurately, just as they may pick up the wrong chess pieces.
Would it be possible to redesign the rules of chess so as to ensure
that a move is nothing other than what the player subjectively intends it
to be? A moment's reflection indicates that the answer is "no." Unless
we are willing to destroy the possibility of the game being played at all,
move is made accordingly.
14 See supra discussion accompanying note 3.
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we will have to allow for some privileged mode (or modes) of expressing
a subjective intent. And the existence of a privileged mode of expression
necessarily attributes to expressive acts within that mode a meaning that,
in principle, can be severed from the player's subjective intent.
It would be possible, of course, to allow for more than one
privileged mode of expression. For example, the rules of chess could
conceivably permit reference to players' physical acts and also to their
notes. But in this case we would need additional rules to resolve
discrepancies between the two sources. Where the players' jotted notes
do not jibe with what they did, which source should carry the day?
Moreover, in the interests of certainty, there must be some limit to the
kinds of evidence used to determine moves. Should a referee be allowed
to consult, for example, records of players' previous practices, expert
opinions on what chess players of similar calibre would normally do, or
players' own testimony after the fact? These questions and the lengthy
inquiries they invite go far to show why, under current practice, players'
moves are determined exclusively by their physical acts.
The autonomy of chess as a participatory order of meaning gives
rise to the possibility of mistake. Two types of mistake should be
distinguished: mistakes of expression and mistakes of interpretation. For
instance, in a variation on our earlier example, a clumsy or
absent-minded player may pick up his Queen when he actually means to
move his Bishop. However, once his hand has grasped the piece, his
mistake cannot be remedied under standard international rules.1S He
must move it and live with the consequences. This is a mistake of
expression.
But the same series of events could be viewed as giving rise to a
mistake of interpretation. In the eyes of an inexperienced observer, the
referee who insists that the player really moved his Queen is making an
interpretive error, because all the extrinsic evidence (the player's written
note, his exclamation of dismay on realizing his error) points to a
different conclusion. And if, like the naive observer, we think that the
job of the referee is to find out what the player intended subjectively, we
might be inclined to agree. However, as we become more familiar with
how the game is played, we realize that no mistake of interpretation has
been made. The job of the referee is simply to determine the meaning
of the physical move under the rules, conventions, and tacit
understandings that inform the game, not to plumb the depths of the
player's subjective consciousness.
15 There is no remedy unless he has first warned his opponent that he is merely adjusting the
position of a piece.
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This is not to deny that a referee may make genuine errors of
interpretation. Misled by a trick of perspective, a referee may wrongly
rule that a player has touched a certain piece when in fact the player has
not made physical contact with it. However, because of the relatively
simple nature of the referee's task and the highly determinate nature of
the act being interpreted, the possibilities for interpretive error in chess
are not great. As we will see, the case is very different when the act
being interpreted is a legal instrument enacted within a highly complex
legal order.
It is useful at this point to pause and consider how our example
looks from the perspective of someone interested mainly in the player's
thought processes: the biographer, psychologist, or curious observer.
Here, the question is what move the player intended to make, rather than
what move he actually made.
Take the example of the biographer. There is no reason why she
should limit herself to the restricted range of evidence considered by the
referee and every reason for her to spread the net of her inquiries as
widely as possible. What explanation did the player give after the
match? Was he generally candid about these things or was he known to
embroider the facts? What were the opinions of those who watched the
match and knew the player well? What can we infer from the player's
level of skill?
The biographer would not have to come to firm conclusions. She
may think, for example, that the evidence regarding the player's
intentions is so contradictory as to be inconclusive. Or she may suspect
that the player was so distracted that he lacked any clearly formulated
intent and acted in a semi-automatic or haphazard manner. By contrast,
the referee or other active participant in the game has to reach a definite
conclusion about the character of a move, otherwise the game will not be
able to continue.16
From the intentionalist perspective, then, the referee's
assumption that the player actually made a certain move may seem naive
or disingenuous, given that the evidence of intent is contradictory and
inconclusive. But this attitude is unwarranted, because it transfers
criteria appropriate to one type of inquiry to a wholly different inquiry.
Just as it would be wrong for a referee to insist to a biographer that the
player "really" intended to move the Queen, citing the evidence of the
physical act performed, so also it would be wrong for the biographer to
insist to the referee that the player "really" moved his Bishop (or made
16 It is conceivable that the rules of a game might allow for a move to be "replayed" where
some doubt arises as to its meaning, but most games do not allow for this possibility.
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two simultaneous moves or failed to make any definite move at all),
citing the conflicting evidence about the player's thought processes.
Another observation carries us closer to the heart of the matter.
Although the intentionalist inquiry is quite different from that of the
participant, it tacitly depends on the participatory perspective. For the
biographer's search for the player's subjective intent is structured by a
participatory grasp of the rules of chess. Without such an
understanding, she would have no reason to puzzle over the player's
intent. There is nothing inherently surprising or contradictory about a
person making a remark, then writing some notes on a pad, then moving
a small object on a board. The player's subjective intention only comes
into question once we know two things: first, under the rules of chess,
the initial two acts have a different meaning from the final act; and,
second, all three acts relate to a unified (if possibly evolving) intention
formulated in light of the game's rules, which require that the player
make a single move at this juncture. In short, the intentionalist inquiry
into the player's state of mind necessarily presupposes the participatory
perspective implicit in the playing of the game and accepts its
assumptions for the purposes of the inquiry.
This conclusion reinforces an earlier observation. We have seen
that the game of chess depends on the assignment of definite meanings
to physical acts and treats the player's subjective state of mind as
irrelevant for its purposes. It follows that the biographer has something
to inquire about only because chess is an autonomous order of meaning.
It is the possible discrepency between the objective meaning of a chess
move and the player's subjective state of mind that gives the
intentionalist inquiry its point and interest. So, for the biographer to
claim, as the result of her investigations, that the player "really" moved
the Bishop rather than the Queen (or "really" did not make any move at
all) would be to repudiate an essential premise of her inquiry and drain
it of any meaning.17
17 Of course, the biographer's perspective is a participatory perspective in its own right, even
if it is one that is distinct from that of the chess-player. The basic difference between the two
perspectives lies in their governing narrative: in one case, the unfolding of a chess game and in the
other the unfolding of a life. In each case, the narrative treats its subject-matter as a meaningful
whole, with a beginning, a middle, and an end (perhaps still to come). In each case, it treats its
subject as an autonomous order of meaning, whose significance is determined by reference to
certain basic values and standards. While the narrative of the game may be embedded in the
narrative of the player's life, like a play within a play, the reverse does not seem possible. On the
role of narrative, see the stimulating discussion in A.C Maclntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral
Theory, 2d ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) c. 15 [hereinafter After
Virtue].
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In short, the rules of chess make up what we may call a
'participatory order of meaning." In the sense used here, a participatory
order is characterized by four elements: (1) autonomy; (2) impersonality;
(3) communality; and (4) rightness. We will spend a little time describing
each characteristic.
First, participants in the game of chess perceive its rules and
practices as an order of meaning that is external to their own minds and
independent of their wills and understandings. The rules are not just
what particular participants would like them to be or even what they
understand them to be. Players know that it is possible to get the rules
wrong, particularly in the early stages of learning the game. The rules
have a life of their own. In this sense, they are experienced as
autonomous.
Of course it is possible for a person, in an idle hour, to invent a
game of solitary chess and make up rules as the person goes along,
changing them at whim. Insofar as the person treats the rules merely as
extensions of shifting personal preferences, the rules will not make up an
autonomous order of meaning. It cannot be said that they are really
rules, or that the person is playing a real game or is truly a player.
However, we can also imagine a case where a person invents the rules of
a game and then proceeds to play it according to those rules, treating
them as an order of meaning independent of the person's will. Here, the
rules can be said to be autonomous of their creator.
The distinction is quickly grasped by children, who are always
inventing new games and inviting other children to play with them.
These games can succeed so long as the other participants sense that the
game's inventor is "playing according to the rules" and not changing
them as the game goes along (usually, it is suspected, to the inventor's
own advantage). If a dispute about the rules breaks out, the game's
inventor may claim to have a viewpoint that has particular authority
("Hey, I should know; I made up the rules!"). However, the inventor
may be surprised to find that the matter has passed into the public
domain and that the other players settle the dispute by informally
deciding which version of the rules is fairest or most fun or most
challenging-in other words, by determining which version best serves
the basic values and principles that the game tacitly embodies.
Should we say, then, that the meaning of the rules lies simply in
the minds of the entire group of participants, who constitute, in the
fashionable phrase, an "interpretive community?" According to this
view, the rules of chess are ultimately whatever the interpretive
community of chess players determine them to be. This view has a
certain obvious truth, but only from a non-participatory perspective. Its
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limitation is that it fails to reflect the characteristic attitude of a
participant in the game. From the vantage point of a participant, the
rules of chess make up an order of meaning that is independent not only
of the participant's own mind (and so autonomous) but also of the mind
of any other person or group of persons. That is, the rules are
impersonal. This is the second of the four characteristics mentioned
earlier.
To maintain, with the interpretivist, that the meaning of the rules
of chess resides simply in the interpretations of the community of chess
players is to confuse the question of what the rules mean with the distinct
question of how those rules are produced and maintained. For example,
you can know the identity of each and every individual in a community
of players and every detail of their words and actions and still fail to
grasp the meaning of the game they are playing. Anyone who has spent
a summer afternoon watching a cricket match for the first time will
understand the point. If you were to ask some nearby spectators at the
match to explain what is going on, you would consider it rude or
deliberately obtuse if they replied "the meaning of the game is whatever
those players out there think it is." Of course, in a sense this would be
right, but only from a non-participatory perspective. What the
spectators would really be telling you is that they cannot be bothered to
initiate you into the mysteries of the game, as understood by a
participant.
To consider briefly our third characteristic, the rules of chess are
experienced by a participant as making up an intrinsically public or
communal system of meaning, which is accessible to others and has a
broadly social or collective significance. When we learn the rules of a
game, whether by playing it or by mastering the articulate rules, we are
drawn into a world of common significance and value. In fact, we may
gain a certain amount of pleasure and satisfaction simply from the sense
of establishing bonds with other people with whom we have otherwise
little in common.18 However, the communal nature of the activity also
imports certain constraints on the possibilities of individual expression
within its confines-a point that we will consider in greater detail
shortly.
Finally, the rules of chess are experienced as "hanging together"
and "making sense," and "fair," and so as more or less right in light of
the purposes they embody and serve. The rules make sense not only in
18 A similiar point is made in a different context in C. Taylor, "Theories of Meaning" in C.
Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985) 248 especially at 263-66.
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the abstract but also, and more importantly, as played. That is, they
allow players to develop coherent patterns of play, to formulate
strategies and counter-strategies and to exercise their creativity and
ingenuity. As such, they allow for the creation of particularized patterns
of meaning in each match. The rules of chess are also experienced as
"fair," in that they ensure a level of equality between the players. In this
respect, they are fairer, for instance, than the rules of some rudimentary
games like tic-tac-toe, where the player who makes the first move has a
decided advantage.
The rules of a communal activity like chess constrain expressive
acts performed within their confines in several important ways. First,
they limit the kinds of meaning it is possible to express within the
enterprise. That is they rule out certain meanings as unattainable or
irrelevant, quite apart from what the author of the act in question
intended. A chess player may mean a succession of moves to illustrate
Wolfe's tactics at the Siege of Quebec, or perhaps the ultimate futility of
life, and the player may succeed brilliantly. But these intentions and the
meanings they seek to convey count for nothing in chess, and the player's
moves will be judged exclusively by the meaning assigned by the rules of
the game. Of course, it is possible that the player is playing a different
game with different rules-in which case it may be possible for the
player to convey the meanings in question within the game's confines.
But if the game is chess, as defined by its current rules and practices,
these meanings are unattainable within the game.
Second, the rules of chess provide a framework which both
directs players on how to express the various meanings that the game
envisages and also enables others to interpret those meanings without
reference to the players' subjective mental states. When players
participate in games of chess, they subordinate their mental states to the
order of the game and mold their thinking and external acts so as to
conform with the rules and conventions of the game. The same holds
true for referees or other participatory observers.
Now, to an observer completely unfamiliar with the rules of
chess or any similar game, the significance of the physical act of moving
a figurine on a checked board is open to the wildest speculation. But
with a little more experience, the meaning of the act becomes plain, even
though the player's larger strategy may still remain unclear. At the
higher levels of the game, the rules are enforced by referees responsible
for ruling on the nature of disputed moves. But it would be wrong to
conclude that the move is constituted by the subjective mental state of
the referee, just as it is wrong to think it is constituted by the subjective
mental state of the player. A chess move has an autonomous meaning
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within a participatory order of rules and practices, a meaning that is
independent of the subjective intent of any particular player or observer.
THE LEGAL ORDER
While a chess move is, in some ways, very different from a
complex legal instrument like a statute, the example sheds an interesting
light on the processes by which a statute is drafted and interpreted. Let
us return for a moment to our discussion of section 7 of the Charter. The
problem there, you recall, arises from a possible discrepancy between
the words actually used in the section and explanations furnished by the
drafters. Which should be taken as determining the section's meaning?
Here again it will be helpful to distinguish between the
participatory and intentionalist perspectives. The citizen, official, judge
or other person concerned with the practical import of the Constitution
will be interested mainly in determining what course of action the phrase
"principles of fundamental justice" requires in the concrete case. This
participatory concern represents the viewpoint of persons who actually
or imaginatively accept the constitutional order as binding on them and
whose inquiries are oriented to action within that order.
On the other hand, the historian, political scientist, or
biographer may be interested in something else: what did the authors
have in mind when they drafted and enacted section 7? Did they really
want to restrict the section to procedural matters but fail to find the right
words to express that intent? Or was there a division of opinion among
the framers that explains the choice of the ambiguous phrase "principles
of fundamental justice?" These sorts of intentionalist inquiries are less
concerned with the conduct required by the section than the mental
processes of the drafters and the events leading up to the choice of
wording.
The participatory perspective is well represented by the Supreme
Court's judgment in the Motor Vehicle Reference. This assumes in effect
that what the authors of section 7 said they aimed to achieve in drafting
the provision is outweighed by what they actually enacted. The meaning
of an enactment is governed by a complex matrix of rules, values,
principles, and conventional meanings, both tacit and articulate, which
exists apart from the subjective intentions of the authors and which the
authors accredit and contribute to by acting within the constitutional
order. In Canadian legal culture, the meaning of a provision is
determined primarily by this public matrix of meaning and not the
drafters' private intentions.
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In this sense, then, an enactment has an autonomous meaning,
which in principle is distinct from the drafters' subjective thoughts and
intentions. The autonomy of the provision's meaning is a function of the
autonomy of the overall legal order, as established by its practices, rules,
vocabulary, and concepts, and at a deeper level by its fundamental values
and principles.
But to say that the legal order is autonomous is not to say that it
is inert, either in its interpretive or substantive rules. The interpretive
rule that discourages reliance on extrinsic evidence of drafters' intent
might conceivably change. If influential judges and writers started to
rely increasingly on extrinsic evidence in construing constitutional
provisions, a shift in interpretive practice would eventually occur. But
such a shift in interpretive practice would merely supplement one mode
of determining autonomous meaning with another.
Consider, for example, the statement made by Mr. Strayer
before the Special Joint Committee. He said that the words
"fundamental justice" in section 7 of the Charter would cover
"procedural due process" but not "what is called substantive due
process, which would impose substantive requirements as to the policy of
the law in question."19 Even if we take this statement as authoritative,
our inquiries are not over. For we now have to interpret the words of
the statement itself. What is "procedural" as opposed to "substantive"
due process, and how do we know which category a given subject-matter
belongs to? Given that the speaker did not supply comprehensive
definitions of these terms (much less a detailed account of their concrete
application), how do we know what they mean in practice? Should we
invite the speaker to furnish an explanation of his explanation? And if
this further explanation still requires interpretation (as it inevitably will),
are we to be drawn down an endless corridor of inconclusive
explanations, like a hall of reflecting mirrors? Or should we perhaps
install the good gentleman as the permanent final arbiter of his own
words?
At some point, I suggest, we will have to assign an autonomous
meaning to Mr. Strayer's explanation (or to some explanation of his
explanation), and that meaning will be determined by reference to our
legal traditions, its concepts, practices, principles and values. So, we
seem to be back where we started, except that we have now substituted
Mr. Strayer's comments (which were not enacted) for the words actually
used in the section. It is doubtful whether this represents an
19 Supra note 6.
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improvement. More importantly, from our perspective, it does not
represent any real change.
As seen earlier, a participatory order of meaning carries with it
the possibility of mistakes of expression. The framers of a legal provision
may choose words that fail to convey the meaning they intend. For
example, the phrase "principles of fundamental justice" turned out to be
singularly inapt if the goal was to convey the meaning "procedural due
process." Mistakes of interpretation may also occur. Even where the
words of a text carry a fairly clear meaning, they are always liable to be
misread. A misreading is a contribution to legal culture and, if backed
by authority, may carry the day and bring about a permanent change in
legal practice. But many misreadings, even when uttered by high
authority, are quietly forgotten or explained away. Legal culture, like
nature, has a way of returning through the back door.
Matters look rather different from the intentionalist perspective,
as adopted by the historian, political scientist, or biographer. Here the
question is not so much what section 7 of the Charter actually means in
Canadian law as what the drafters subjectively intended it to mean. Of
course, the historian has no reason to confine her inquiries to the words
actually used in the constitutional text, or even to statements made in
official or public contexts. She will want to extend the scope of her
inquiries to include all possible sources of evidence. So, she will likely
interview the major participants in the process of drafting and
enactment, consult their notes, memos and diaries where available,
speak to astute observors of the constitutional scene, and so on.
Moreover, she does not have to reach definite conclusions as to what
was intended. She may find that the drafters and enactors give such
conflicting accounts of their intentions that no clear consensus emerges.
The difference between the participatory and intentionalist
perspectives is a fertile ground for misunderstanding. To the historian
who has sifted painstakingly through the materials leading up to the
enactment of section 7, it may seem disingenuous for a court to say that
the section covers matters of substance as well as procedure and wilfully
blind for it to ignore or downplay the extrinsic evidence of legislative
intent. But such a conclusion extends the intentionalist perspective
beyond its proper bounds. By the same token, it would be wrong for a
judge to insist to the historian that the drafters of the Charter really
intended the section to cover substantive matters or to suggest that she
should confine her inquiries to the bare words of the text.
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, there is an important link between
the intentionalist and participatory perspectives. The historian's search
for the drafters' intent is tacitly structured by a participatory
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understanding of the legal order. In the absence of such an
understanding, the question of the drafters' intent does not arise as a
relevant object of inquiry. There is nothing inherently significant in the
fact that certain individuals speak to one another and then write things
down on paper and then say more things, and so on. The question of
"drafters' intent" only comes into play when we know that the people in
question are "drafting a constitution," a process that has meaning only
within a certain tradition. Further, until we spot a possible discrepancy
between the ordinary legal meaning of the constitutional text and the
ordinary legal meaning of explanatory statements made by the drafters,
no real problem arises for consideration. That is, an appreciation of the
problem depends upon a participatory grasp of the legal order, the
meanings it assigns to certain terms, and the drafting process as a whole.
Our findings are summarized in the following diagrams. Figures
1 and 2 represent the internal attitudes of people involved in playing and
observing a chess game, and Figures 3 and 4 the attitudes of people
involved in drafting and interpreting a legal provision.
Figure 1: The Player Making the Move
Rules of the Game <-> Projected Move -> Player's Physical Act
Figure 2: The Participatory Observer
Rules of the Game <-> Player's Physical Act -> Move
In the first diagram, we see that the player, immersing himself in
the participatory order of the game's rules, formulates a projected move
and commits himself in a physical act. Although the diagram displays
this process as a sequence, all three stages may in fact be fused in a
single, indivisible act. The second diagram shows that the observer,
similarly immersing herself in the rules, attributes to the physical act the
meaning assigned by the rules, which is the "move." It is important to
note that the move is not the physical act any more than it is the
subjective state of mind of the player or observer. It is an immaterial
concept dependent on the rules of the game, a concept that the physical
act is taken to evidence or embody.
A parallel set of diagrams may be drawn for a statutory
provision:
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Figure 3: The Authors
Legal Order <- Projected Meaning -> Statutory Provision
Figure 4: The Interpreters
Legaf Order <- Statutory Provision -- Meaning
In these diagrams, we see that the authors, immersing
themselves in the ongoing legal order, direct their minds to the
production of autonomous meaning within that order, and in so doing,
draft and enact a statutory provision. The interpreters, likewise
immersing themselves within the legal order, direct their minds to the
provision and assign it the concrete meaning that the order suggests in
the context. Once again, it is important to realize that the legal
provision is not the written provision considered in its material aspects,
any more than the provision is the intentions or ideas of the authors or
interpreters. It is an immaterial body of meaning within a legal culture,
a body of meaning that the material enactment is taken to express.
Clearly, the parallel between the game of chess and a legal order
is far from exact. The physical act of moving a chess piece has a single,
highly determinate meaning assigned by the rules of chess, which make
up a simple, determinate, and mainly articulate system. By contrast, a
legal provision has a complex, rather indeterminate meaning assigned by
the legal culture, which is itself complex and indeterminate and which
has a large and important tacit component, embodied in inarticulate
practices, attitudes, and expectations. These are significant differences.
It is not suggested that drafting and interpreting a legal provision is in all
respects identical to making and interpreting a move in chess.
Nevertheless, a legal provision, like a chess move, is governed in
its meaning by an existing body of practice specific to the community in
question, by the tacit and articulate understandings that make up the
practice and the basic values that inform it. In principle, the legal order
within which a new legal provision is enacted is autonomous and the
provision has an autonomous meaning within the order. From a
participatory point of view, that meaning is not constituted by the
subjective intentions of those responsible for drafting and enacting the
provision or by the wills of those responsible for interpreting and
applying it.
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Although the written law is obviously the work of an identifiable
group of people, its meaning may in some cases be different from what
its historical authors subjectively intended, and in any case is not tied to
those intentions. As such it is often capable of growth and change. In
Canadian legal culture, the role of the authors of an enactment is
precisely to bring into being a text with an autonomous (and often
evolving) meaning.
If the law's meaning is not found in the minds of its authors,
neither is it found in the subjective intentions of its interpreters.
Although in a trivial and obvious sense the interpreters are the
originators of the interpretive acts they perform, their role is to
instantiate the law's own meaning, not to supply their own. They may, of
course, fail at their task; any success that they have will inevitably be
partial. Some interpreters may, moreover, abuse their powers and
employ interpretation as a cover for the imposition of subjective and
partisan views. But legal interpretation is characterized by a process in
which interpreters subordinate their wills to a participatory order of
meaning. The concepts of mistake and bad faith are parasitic upon this
ideal conception. Unless we believe that a task may be carried out more
or less correctly and more or less in good faith, we have no basis for
thinking that it can be done wrongly or in bad faith.
THE LOCAL AND THE TRANSCENDENT
I have argued, then, that the proximate source of a statute's
meaning lies in the legal culture of the community. In other words, a
legal culture is itself a participatory order of meaning, which vests the
written law with significance at several distinct levels. Most obviously, it
furnishes the practical and normative context which allows legal
provisions to gain concrete meanings. At a more abstract level, it also
supplies the basic concept of a "statute," which involves certain
structural characteristics quite apart from a statute's specific content.
In saying that the Canadian legal culture is a "participatory
order of meaning," I have in mind the four basic characteristics
identified earlier: (1) autonomy; (2) impersonality; (3) communality; and
(4) rightness. Since we have already discussed these, it will only be
necessary to say a few words about each.
First, as participants in the legal order, we experience that order
as something apart from our individual selves and in that sense as
autonomous-that is, constituted by factors other than our own
particular intentions, perceptions, ideas, emotions, drives, and so on.
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Although we recognize, if we are reflective, that our experience of that
order is inevitably our experience, we still see the object of our
experience as something other, something to which we endeavour to
bend our understanding, so that our mind in a sense fuses with a
meaningful order that lies beyond it.
Second, a participant also views the legal order as
impersonal-that is, as a meaningful order which exists apart from the
subjective wills, intentions, and ideas of other individuals. By
"impersonal" I do not mean "anonymous." The impersonality of the
legal order lies in the fact that its meaning is severable from the will of
any particular individual or group of individuals, not in the happenstance
that its authors are often unknown to us. Even if we could identify with
certainty the framers of a certain enactment, viewed from a participatory
perspective the document would still be an impersonal element of an
impersonal legal order.
Third, the legal order is also experienced as communal or public.
In part, this means that it is recognized as accessible and significant not
only to us as individuals but also to other participants, and indeed to our
community as a whole. It also means that our encounters with that
order are perceived as drawing us increasingly into a communal realm of
meaning. Our experience of the legal order is unlike some wholly
private experience, such as a dream or hallucination, which we later
recognize as essentially personal and subjective in significance, even if
similar to experiences undergone by others.
Finally, the legal order is experienced by us as in some measure
right, even if we have reservations, perhaps profound ones, about the
justice of some features of that order. The legal order does not have to
be fully "right" to be a participatory order of meaning. However, its
status as an order increases in proportion to its justice, and if it sank
below a certain level of justice, it would cease to be a legal order at all.
The justice of a legal order is best understood as a relationship
between certain transcendent values and principles and the particular
context of a certain society2 0 The best evidence of the existence of these
values and principles is our participatory grasp of meaning in the
concrete circumstances of a specific case. While this understanding has
a purely local character, it carries intimations of the transcendent. We
grope toward a meaning that seems to lie both within and beyond what is
immediately at hand. Our normal access to that meaning is at the level
of our concrete experience, as legal practitioners immersed in a local
legal culture, rather than as philosophers or mystics.
20 See the illuminating treatment of this question in Finnis, supra note 12.
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty makes a similar point in a somewhat
broader context:
So long as I keep before me the ideal of an absolute observor, of knowledge in the
absence of any viewpoint, I can only see my situation as being a source of error. But once
I have acknowledged that through it I am geared to all actions and all knowledge that are
meaningful to me, and that it is gradually filled with everything that may be for me, then
my contact with the social in the finitude of my situation is revealed to me as the starting
point of all truth, including that of science and, since we have some idea of the truth,
since we are inside truth and cannot get outside it, all that I can do is define a truth
within the situation.2 1
When we reflect on our experiences as participants in the legal
order, we can recall occasions when we identified the meaning of a legal
provision by reference to basic values and principles which in some sense
lay both within and beyond the legal order. These values and principles
are at the heart of our participatory understanding of the legal order and
our appraisal of its ultimate meaning and worth. I am not suggesting,
however, that we should necessarily "read" transcendent meaning into
the legal order on the basis of explicit philosophical or spiritual beliefs.
Such an approach may reverse the proper order of reasoning and risk
distorting the verity of our concrete moral and legal experience.
Acts of clear injustice have a special capacity to shock us into a
recognition of the existence of transcendent values. The appalling
cruelties of an Auschwitz or Buchenwald bear unintended witness to the
basic rights and values that they violate. For we can have no grounds,
beyond mere personal preference or social convention, for holding that
such acts are unjust, unless we can discern, however imperfectly, the
shape of an objectively better way of doing things. We should hold fast
to our concrete sense of injustice and its tacit revelation of a
transcendent order of justice, even if we do not know (and perhaps
cannot know) the origins or basis of such an order or what form it
ultimately takes.
It is interesting to compare this point with the reflections of
Albert Einstein on the existence of order in the natural world, as
expressed in a letter to Maurice Solovine on 30 March 1952:
You find it strange that I consider the comprehensibility of the world (to the extent that
we are authorized to speak of such a comprehensibility) as a miracle or as an eternal
mystery. Well, apriori one should expect a chaotic world which cannot be grasped by the
mind in anyway. One could (yes one should) expect the world to be subjected to law only
21 M. Merleau-Ponty, "Le philosophe et la sociologie" in M. Merleau-Ponty, tloge de la
philosophie et autres essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) 112 at 136-37; quoted and translated in I.
Prigogine & I. Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam
Books, 1984) at 299.
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to the extent that we order it through our intelligence. Ordering of this kind would be
like the alphabetical ordering of the words of a language. By contrast, the kind of order
created by Newton's theory of gravitation, for instance, is wholly different. Even if the
axioms of the theory are proposed by man, the success of such a project presupposes a
high degree of ordering of the objective world, and this could not be expected a pdoni.
That is the "miracle" which is being constantly reinforced as our knowledge expands.
There lies the weakness of positivists and professional atheists who are elated because
they feel that they have not only successfully rid the world of gods but "bared the
miracles." Oddly enough, we must be satisfied to acknowledge the "miracle" without
there being any legitimate way for us to approach it. I am forced to add that just to keep
you from thinking that-weakened by age-I have fallen prey to the parsons.22
The tension between the local and the transcendent is
exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in the Motor Vehicle
Reference.23 The substantive point at issue there was the constitutional
validity of an "absolute liability" provision which specified that a person
could be convicted of driving a motor vehicle while his driver's licence
was suspended even if he or she was not aware of the suspension and
could not reasonably have known of it. The offence carried a minimum
prison term of seven days. The Supreme Court held unanimously that
the provision was constitutionally invalid for depriving a person of his or
her liberty contrary to the principles of fundamental justice under
section 7 of the Charter.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Lamer observed that the
words "principles of fundamental justice" referred to principles that
have been recognized by the common law and international conventions
on human rights as essential elements of a system for the administration
of justice which is founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the
human person and on the rule of law. He held that the words could not
be given an exhaustive definition but would take on concrete meaning on
a case by case basis as the courts addressed alleged violations of section
7i24
Justice Lamer noted that from time immemorial the legal system
has harboured the principle that the innocent not be punished. This
principle has been recognized as an essential element of a justice system
founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the human person and
the rule of law. It means that a person should not be found guilty of an
offence unless that person has a guilty mind or is at fault. So a law that
22 A. Einstein, Letters to Solovine, trans. W. Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1987) at
131-33 [typographical error corrected in text].
23 Supra note 7.
24 1bi& at 504-05 and 512-13.
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combines absolute liability and imprisonment violates section 7 of the
Charter.25
In a separate opinion, Justice Wilson appealed to the basic
principles of punishment and reasoned that it was unwarranted to attach
a mandatory prison term to an absolute liability offence:
I think the conscience of the court would be shocked and the administration of justice
brought into disrepute by such an unreasonable and extravagent penalty. It is totally
disproportionate to the offence and quite incompatible with the objective of a penal
system.... It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed must bear
some relationship to the offence; it must be a "fit" sentence proportionate to the
seriousness of the offence. Only if this is so can the public be satisfied that the offender
"deserved" the punishment he received and feel a confidence in the fairness and
rationality of the system.26
In her view, a mandatory prison term for an offence committed
unknowingly and after the exercise of due diligence was "grossly
excessive and inhumane" and was not required either to reduce the
incidence of the offence or to satisfy the need for atonement. So the
section under review offended the principles of fundamental justice
embodied in the penal system and violated section 7 of the Charter.27
It can be seen that both Justices Lamer and Wilson ground their
opinions in the basic tenets of the Canadian legal system, as these have
developed historically. However, their approaches involve far more than
a mechanical identification of legal rules laid down in previous decisions.
For not every legal rule is a principle of fundamental justice.2 8 Rather,
for Justice Lamer, the process involves a determination of what is
essential to uphold the dignity and worth of the individual and the rule
of law. And, for Justice Wilson, it turns in the end on what shocks the
conscience of the court.
To sum up, the basic character of the legal order, as experienced
by a participant, lies in its autonomy, its impersonality, its communal
character, and above all its rightness or justice. This list is not exhaustive,
and the characteristics identified are not completely distinct but
permeate and reinforce one another. Moreover, these characteristics
are not all-or-nothing matters but exist in degrees, so that the status of a
legal system, as a participatory order of meaning, is enhanced as it
increasingly exemplifies them. And a legal order that fails to embody
25 1bid. at 514-15.
26 Ibid. at 533
2 7 1bid. at 534.
28 Ibid. at 530-31.
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these characteristics to a minimal degree is not in truth a legal order at
all.
According to this approach, then, the concept of law is an ideal
concept, which portrays the legal order as a kind of concrete social
"cosmos" devoted to justice and the common good, with links to a
transcendent cosmos of basic values and principles.29 An ideal concept
is one-that identifies an entity by reference to a normative ideal. For
example, a machine can be understood as a machine, rather than as a
mere collection of miscellaneous items, only on the assumption that it
has an inner ordering principle, that its parts are related to one another
so as to serve some purpose or purposes. Were it to lack any ordering
principle and so serve no purpose, it could not be understood as a
machine. Indeed, it could not be understood as a "whole" but only as an
agglomeration of physically proximate items. By the same token, if what
passes for a legal system in fact lacks any appreciable degree of
rightness, then, according to the view presented here, it does not
constitute a legal system at all.
To call something a "legal order" when it is incapable of
securing a minimal degree of justice makes no more sense than to say
that a certain object is a "clock" when it has no capacity whatever to
mark the passage of time. In other words, to speak of a legal order as a
legal order involves a tacit appraisal of its basic aptitude to serve justice
and basic human values. Of course, there are simulacrums that closely
resemble the "genuine article" but lack its inner ordering principle. A
ceramic model of a clock may be so realistic that it momentarily fools us
into thinking that it is authentic. A putative legal system may have
impressive trappings-legislature, courts, police, statute books, law
reports-and yet lack the ability to secure even a modicum of justice. As
such, it cannot be understood as a genuine legal order.
2 9 The idea that the social order is in some sense linked with the cosmic order is, of course, an
ancient one. Werner Jaeger argues that as early as the sixth century B.C.E. the natural philosopher,
Anaximander of Miletus, transferred the concept of dik from the social life of the city-state to the
natural domain:
This is the origin of the philosophical idea of the cosmos: for the word originally signifies
the right order in a state or other community. The philosopher, by projecting the idea of
a political cosmos upon the whole of nature, claims that isonomia and not pleonexia must
be the leading principle not only of human life but of the nature of things; and his claim is
a striking witness to the fact that in his age the new political ideal of justice and law had
become the centre of all thought, the basis of existence, the real source of men's faith in
the purpose and meaning of the world.
W. Jaeger, Paidela: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. G. Highet, 2d ed., vol. 1 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1945) at 110; see also at 158-61.
[VOL 34 No. 3
Law's Meaning
In speaking of a "legal order," I do not mean that the law exists
in an entirely explicit form or that it is capable of being articulated in a
complete or satisfactory way. Much less do I mean that the legal order,
or its written portion, is determinate or yields determinate answers to
specific questions arising within the order. Further, I do not mean that
the legal order is static and incapable of change or that it dictates a
"conservative" approach to legal matters. Finally, I do not mean that it
is a self-contained set of rules or a logically isolable system, distinct from
morality and notions of the common good.
To elaborate a little on these points, I suggest that, far from
being articulate, much of the legal order exists only in a tacit form and in
principle is largely inarticulable. That is, a participant in the order
learns about it in much the same way that a person learns how to speak
and write in a mother tongue: by immersion, imitation, correction, and
unceasing practice, supplemented by measured doses of explicit
instruction. Although it is possible, of course, to discern rules of
grammar in the rushing stream of a living language, it is doubtful how far
they can ever capture its inner dynamics, much less give any sense of its
fluidity and subtlety. In any case, it is common experience that some
sophisticated speakers and writers have only a minimal ability to
articulate rules of grammar and that sophisticated grammarians and
linguists can be faltering speakers and pedestrian stylists.
This observation leads to the second point. To say that the legal
order is autonomous is not to suggest that the verbal formulas found in
legal enactments have a determinate meaning or can give specific
guidance on how to act in concrete situations. The bare knowledge that
you should act in conformity with the "principles of fundamental
justice," as stipulated by section 7 of the Charter, can no more enable
you to act justly than the knowledge that you should speak a language
"correctly" can equip you to choose your words aright. In both cases,
the abstract formulas are practical maxims, which make little sense apart
from the rich and complex practice they stand in for. They can be
grasped and applied only by someone already well-versed in the
practice.30 They are not like geometrical axioms, from which a whole
series of specific propositions can be deduced with the aid of logic, or
like "do-it-yourself' kits, which take novices by the hand and show them
exactly what to do.
These two points converge in suggesting that the legal order is
not a system of abstract, articulate rules that can be grasped by reflective
30 See the interesting treatment of maxims in Polanyi, supra note 12, especially at 30-31 and
49-65.
1996]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
reason. Rather the legal order is a body of largely tacit knowledge
manifested principally in the operations of practical reason in concrete
situations. It is primarily knowledge of "how to act" and "what the right
thing to do is" rather than knowledge that "such and such proposition is
the case."
This is not to deny that practical judgments within the legal
order may have a significant reflective component and are often aided by
an articulate process of reasoning that involves the manipulation of
abstract propositions. It is simply to maintain that, however elaborate
the reasons given for reaching a decision and however impressive the
logical apparatus employed, the nerve of the process lies in a sense of
what is right in the concrete circumstances of the case, as seen in the
broader legal culture. This viewpoint is reflected in the common law
principle that the only binding part of a court judgment is what is strictly
necessary to the decision; all else is merely "by the way."
As for the third point, the law is an "order" notwithstanding that
it was born and nurtured in conflict and harbours disparate and
antagonistic elements. A legal tradition is characterized by inner
tensions, which are a main source of its ability to change and adapt. In
large part, these tensions result from the fact that the law embodies and
serves a variety of basic goods and values, which are equally fundamental
and incommensurable 3 1 Yet not all of these goods and values can be
served simultaneously or to the same degree in every legal provision.
Drafting a statute necessarily involves difficult choices and compromises,
which are made in light of other choices and compromises already
embodied in the ongoing legal order as a whole and in the living
tradition it represents. So, to say that the law is an order of meaning is
not to suggest that it is homogeneous or incapable of change. A
tradition need not be traditiona. 2
Finally, the legal or.der is not a self-contained system of
normative propositions identifiable by reference to some master rule or
"rule of recognition," as some would have i 3 3 Rather, the legal order is
imbued with notions of morality and the common good, so that the
question of what the legal order specifically requires or permits cannot
properly be divorced from the question of what is good for the citizen
31 See Finnis, supra note 12, c. 3-5; and I. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969) at 167-72.
32 See MacIntyre's account of tradition in After Virtue, supra note 17, especially at 221-22; and
A.C. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1988), c. 18-20.
33This is Hart's well-known thesis in The Concept of Law, supra note 2.
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and the community at large. The interpenetration of law and basic
values is not a necessary evil, something to be regretted and overcome as
far as possible. Basic values are the lifeblood of the law; to drain them
away is the first stage of a ritual embalming.
So, reaching right decisions within the legal order does not
require detachment from matters of value. To the contrary, correct
decisions can only be reached within a framework of commitment to
justice and basic human values, a commitment that must at times
approach the passionate.

